



## STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION

### CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

A STRATEGIC RED TEAM ITEM OF INTEREST

January 1991

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## **STRATEGIC RED TEAM MISSION**

The SDIO Countermeasures Program Strategic Red Team (SRT) consists of Soviet specialists, defense analysts, and intelligence analysts from private industry, federally funded research centers, and national laboratories. The SRT assists SDIO by (1) examining candidate technical countermeasures and plans for their operational use in terms of likelihood of actual Soviet development and deployment, resource tradeoffs, and consistency with Soviet style, and (2) assessing potential Soviet policies, arms control proposals, and propaganda approaches that could affect Soviet responses to the SDI program. The SRT works with the intelligence community to keep apprised of government assessments of Soviet capabilities and to share with the government insights on Soviet policies and behavior. SRT analyses and findings are provided to the technical Red/Blue process of the Countermeasures Program, SDIO officials, and others within the defense establishment.

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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Purpose**

Recently, a series of articles appeared in the Soviet press discussing new and, in some cases, "radical" proposals for changing the structure, mission, and forces of Soviet strategic defenses, including ballistic missile defense (BMD). Because of the potential impact of the Soviet position on BMD on the Strategic Defense Initiative program, the Strategic Red Team analyzed this discussion in light of traditional Soviet military thought and the on-going debate over defense sufficiency.

### **Conclusion**

None of the proposed alternatives to official policy regarding BMD that are being debated in the USSR has garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. Based on the majority of recent articles and some statements by officials, it appears that if the Soviets decide to move toward expanded BMD capabilities, their preference will be for revision of the ABM Treaty to permit additional BMD sites and ground-based interceptors. The extent to which additional defensive capabilities and characteristics--such as space basing--might ultimately be negotiable cannot be determined from available evidence.

### **BMD and the ABM Treaty in Traditional Soviet Military Thought**

Assuming a constant danger of war, traditional Soviet military thought mandated a complementary strategic offense-strategic defense posture as a means to attain victory in war. Such victory assumed the destruction of the opponent and the survival of the Soviet Union, its political system, economic infrastructure, and war-making capability.

Early in the postwar decades, the Soviet leadership pressed hard to achieve the capability for these dual requirements in its military strategy, force structure, and weapons procurement programs. In contrast to Western tendencies, the Soviets viewed strategic offense and defense as complementary, mutually reinforcing, and required for success in war.

By the mid-1960s, however, the apparent limitations of Soviet BMD technology were apparent and Soviet strategic thought proceeded from three premises:

- Extremely effective BMD was impossible in the near term.
- Preemptive counterforce strikes had to be the primary instrument for destroying the opponent and reducing damage to the Soviet Union.
- Strategic defenses, including BMD, remained integral to limiting the potential damage that U.S. retaliatory strikes could inflict.

The 1969 U.S. announcement of intentions to deploy a Safeguard BMD for the protection of U.S. strategic offensive forces jeopardized Soviet preemptive counterforce planning. There was, therefore, significant incentive and logic in the Soviet drive for BMD limitations in SALT I. From the Soviet perspective, the resultant 1972 ABM Treaty provided at least three major benefits: (1) a continuing free ride for Soviet ballistic missiles, (2) constraint in a BMD competition, likely to end at Soviet disadvantage, and (3) limited impediments to BMD R&D and no restrictions on the deployment of other defense elements (ASATs, ATBMs, SAMs, civil defense, etc.). The Soviets had not lost interest in strategic defense. In the context of the U.S. Safeguard program, however, they determined that strict limitation on BMD deployment was preferable to a major U.S. capability to defend its strategic offensive forces. The Soviet decision to pursue BMD limitation does not appear to have been derived from an endorsement of Western notions of mutual vulnerability and deterrence "stability". It was a logical extension of the Soviet strategy to emphasize counterforce offensive capabilities in support of the wartime objectives of destroying the opponent and limiting damage to the Soviet Union.

#### **Expressed Soviet Views on BMD and the ABM Treaty From the Introduction of SDI to 1989**

In view of the fact that the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty, at least in part, to protect their offensive counterforce approach to defeating the enemy and limiting damage to the Soviet Union, President Reagan's introduction of SDI caused great concern in the Soviet Union. Within three days of SDI's debut on 23 March 1983, Soviet Communist Party chief Yuriy Andropov denounced the concept of strategic defense. Soviet military spokesmen subsequently charged that the SDI was intended to enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war at an acceptable price. Under General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet officials continued to oppose SDI and called for a stricter interpretation of the ABM Treaty than previously understood by the United States.

According to some published and personal reports, this response was driven by not only Soviet strategic requirements, but also concern that greater U.S. exploitation of space for military purposes would provide the U.S. with an extremely important force multiplier for terrestrial forces. The four basic Soviet

counterarguments to SDI to be aired publicly are that it is: inherently destabilizing; integral to U.S. first-strike plans; easily defeated by asymmetric offensive countermeasures; and a threat to offensive force reductions. These same arguments, which repeat much of the commentary by Western critics, were also used to criticize the earlier Safeguard BMD program.

Although these types of arguments against SDI have been repeated frequently by Soviet officials, the tone of the Soviet reaction can be divided into two general periods: from 1983 to 1986, and from 1986 to 1989. The distinguishing feature, beginning in 1986, has been an overall reduction in the Soviets' public effort to discredit SDI, and an apparent reduction in the urgency with which the Soviet Union views the program. Time and an obvious downturn in Congressional support for SDI and near-term BMD deployment may have ameliorated Soviet concerns. Nevertheless, despite this apparent reduction in the intensity of Soviet opposition and some concessions at the 1987 Washington Summit, through 1988 the Soviets appeared to be unanimous in their public opposition to expanded BMD. Soviet officials continued to express a linkage between START and U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty as defined by the Soviet Union.

In early 1989, however, Soviet statements and articles began to appear that suggested an internal debate regarding BMD and greater interest by some Soviet writers and officials in mutual BMD deployment.

### **The Context for the Current Debate**

By 1985, Soviet leaders generally accepted the need to make systematic changes. For all, including those who viewed military competition as the critical long-term problem, economic revitalization was the near-term priority. As the consumer of resources from a shrinking economic base, even the military leadership recognized that short-term benefits might produce long-term disadvantage. Moreover, given the projected trend, it was commonly accepted that economic reform had to be fundamental, not superficial, with enough sociopolitical incentive to reinvigorate the populace.

For the first four years of the Gorbachev regime, therefore, there was a fairly stable--though not unanimous--consensus within the leadership that to refurbish the general economic and technological base, the Armed Forces would have to accept constraints in growth and modernization, convert some of its facilities to assist in the general economic shift from a quantitative to a qualitative thrust, and cut existing forces.

By early 1989, initial reductions were decided. However, it was becoming increasingly obvious in the assessment of some Soviet officials that even these major steps were insufficient to produce the resource savings necessary to invigorate the general economy. Larger cuts would have to be made, cuts which some believed had to impact not simply the fat but the muscle of the Soviet Armed Forces. Without refuting the economic imperatives of the reformists, other Soviet officials contended that the argument was offset by what

they perceived as an unchanging threat from the West, the countering of which had to be a high priority of the regime.

A debate on the future of the Air Defense Forces generally, and BMD specifically became apparent as a sub-set of this broad internal debate on "defense sufficiency." Since early 1989, some statements by Soviet officials have appeared publicly that indicate an increased flexibility regarding the possibility of mutual BMD deployment. Increased support for BMD by some Soviet writers and officials appears to be the result of: 1) recognition of the threat posed to the Soviet Union by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Third World--including the threat of purposeful and unauthorized/accidental strikes; and, 2) the perceived viability of the U.S. SDI program.

### **BMD and the ABM Treaty: The Current Debate**

Within the context of broader debates on the general requirements for reasonable sufficiency, beginning in early 1989, Soviet officials and other writers began to air publicly five competing views on BMD and the ABM Treaty:

- advocates of mutual strategic offense dominance at lower levels with minimal strategic anti-aircraft defense and no BMD
- advocates of mutual offense dominance at lower levels with continued observance of the current ABM Treaty "as signed," which is official policy
- advocates of mutual offense dominance with mutual deployment of an agreed number of BMD sites and ground-based BMD interceptors
- advocates of Soviet strategic defense modernization and expansion, including BMD, to offset a growing Western threat
- advocates of mutual strategic anti-missile defense dominance with mutual strategic offensive reductions

The principal points of each position are summarized below.

**Offense Only.** This viewpoint argues for restructuring the Soviet Armed Forces to meet war prevention, not war-making, criteria at lower force levels. While positing that major conflict on any level is highly improbable, it is maintained that the optimum Soviet operation, if central strategic war should occur, would be retaliatory countervalue strikes. To this end, qualitative improvements should be aimed at developing a survivable, minimal Soviet countervalue retaliatory capability. A key assumption is that the traditional goals of Soviet damage limitation by either offensive strikes or strategic defenses are impossible to attain. Thus, this view generally opposes BMD for any purpose, at even the lowest numerical levels.



Offense Dominance Within ABM Treaty Observance. Closely akin to, but less extreme than, the offense-only position are the supporters of the official Soviet declaratory position that START is linked to the observance of the ABM Treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972." A modification in this official position acknowledged publicly by the Soviets has been a Soviet willingness to establish the linkage by unilateral declaration, rather than as an explicit requirement in a future START agreement.

Offense Dominance With Expanded Ground-Based BMD Interceptors. In the main, this group tends to agree that the East-West military relationship is fairly stable and that a major conflict is improbable. They endorse a relaxation of the ABM Treaty and expansion of ground-based BMD interceptors. They appear to be motivated by the dangers of Nth country attacks, as well as accidental and unsanctioned launches.

To some extent, therefore, the type of defense proposed is a defense against peripheral states. However, that it is not only anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) defense that is being discussed is evident. The advocates generally acknowledge that the deployment of the defense will require a revision of the ABM Treaty and should be implemented cooperatively with the United States. Since ATBM defenses do not fall within the scope of the ABM Treaty, suggestions of such requirements clearly include a strategic anti-missile defense capability.

Soviet Strategic Defense Modernization and Expansion. Like all other versions of opposition to the offense-only view, against whom their writings are explicitly addressed, proponents of this alternative perceive a greater possibility for major war. While some argue for a relatively higher probability of nuclear exchanges at the very outset of a conflict than others, they agree that an initial conventional conflict contains considerable prospects for escalation because they presume that conventional strikes will include attacks on Soviet Union-based nuclear assets. Thus, they plead the case for a robust Soviet BMD system capable of countering U.S. "offensive air-space operations" and "air-space attack means".

Following the unanimous opinion of all other discussants, the group agrees that no Soviet defense at any level will be 100 percent effective. Rather, the proponents justify defenses on the traditional standard of "relative defensibility" of key Soviet societal and war-making resources. Though vague on the size of strategic defenses required, the bottom line, as expressed by one writer, is the notion that "it is impossible to economize on air defense," which in this particular discussion included BMD.

Defense Dominance. At the opposite extreme of the offense-only view is the position that questions the wisdom of deterrence and stability based principally on strategic offensive forces. While noting that the ABM Treaty may have been appropriate in its time, proponents of this view maintain that circumstances have changed and the Treaty needs to be reevaluated in the context of (1) a truly defensive Soviet military doctrine and (2) the continuing

U.S. commitment to SDI-related work. With mutual reductions in strategic offenses, as well as "stringent" limitations on active technical countermeasures and defense suppression, it is argued, mutual transition to defense dominance would ensure stability insofar as neither side could effectively attack the other even in a crisis situation. To those who counter that the transition would entail considerable risk, this article responds that the process should be gradual, coordinated, and phased.

The proposed alternatives outlined above are based on approximately 18 Soviet articles or statements explicitly discussing BMD and appearing since 1989. It should be noted that two of the positions outlined above, the first and the fifth, are represented in a single article or by a single author.

To date, none of the proposed alternatives--judging from available data--appears to have garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. It is not possible to identify the relative political weight behind the alternatives to declared policy. Conversely, none of the positions, including official policy, seems to have sufficient strength and authority to close the discussion. Thus, the debate continues.

### **Apparent Soviet Architectural Preferences**

The available evidence is insufficient to permit a determination of whether or how the Soviets will shift their policy position with regard to BMD deployment and the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, there is evidence, from open Soviet publications and some statements by Soviet officials, that provides a general outline of Soviet preferences for any expansion of permitted BMD capabilities.

These statements typically indicate a general opposition to the deployment of space-based BMD interceptors. For example, General Major V. Belous and General Lieutenant M. Vinogradov wrote in the 23 August issue of *Sovetskaya Rossiya* that the Soviet Union and the United States may need to deploy BMD against Third Party threats, "However, one provision that remains fundamental is the non-siting in space of strike weapons...." Some statements, however, do endorse space basing. In an article appearing in *Pravda* on 20 July 1989, Professor V. Etkin, Chief of Applied Space Physics at the Institute of Space Research, suggested the extension of cooperative BMD systems into space. Another article by M. Aleksandrov of the Foreign Affairs Ministry distinguished between space basing for sensors and interceptors, endorsing the former. And, in the fall of 1989, Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov stated, as reported in TASS (September 26), that "all devices that are not weapons can be permitted in space."

Most recent statements indicate that Soviet interest would be in the deployment of a "thin" ground-based ABM shield. These have cited ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World as justification for possible deployment of additional BMD. Concern about the threat from ballistic missile proliferation can

be seen in numerous recent Soviet statements and articles, including in the Soviet Defense Ministry's Draft Reform Plan. If Moscow in fact agrees to amend the Treaty, based on the available evidence it probably would be in the context of this threat.

The majority of recent articles supporting an expansion of BMD appears to endorse a relatively thin ground-based BMD shield under a revised ABM Treaty. Accordingly, allowance for only such a system could suffice, and would impede any U.S. move to deploy space-based SDI interceptors. The scope for BMD expansion preferred by the Soviets may be gleaned from several recent statements. These identify or acknowledge 1,000 ground-based interceptors as levels associated with Third-Party threats.

In summary, given available evidence, it appears that if the Soviets decide to move toward expanded BMD capabilities, their preference will be for revision of the ABM Treaty to permit additional ground-based sites and interceptors. The extent to which additional defensive capabilities and characteristics, such as space-basing, might be negotiable cannot be determined from available evidence. Based on past Soviet behavior and some recent statements, it is likely to be affected by the level of demonstrated U.S. commitment to the program.

## **II. CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES**

### **PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND**

#### **General Purpose**

This report analyzes the current debate<sup>1</sup> within the Soviet Union regarding ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the ABM Treaty.

#### **Background**

By early 1989, a number of converging factors caused some Soviet civilian and military commentators to publish a series of new and, in some cases, "radical" proposals for changing the organizational structure, mission, and forces of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, one of the five independent services of the Soviet Armed Forces and the one tasked with responsibility for strategic anti-aircraft, anti-missile, and anti-space defenses. Evoking arguments and direct counterarguments, the result of these articles has been an ongoing and comprehensive debate concerning the future make-up of the Soviet Air Defense Forces.

While the commentaries in the current debate appear to devote relatively more attention to the anti-aircraft aspect of the air defense issue, this survey will focus on the BMD controversy. Thus, this review does not attempt to fully reflect the depth and scope of attention in the original Soviet discussions given to Soviet views on strategic defense in general or the anti-aircraft/anti-cruise missile aspect in particular.

Specifically, the report will address four major issues:

1. The role of BMD in traditional Soviet military thought, strategy, and arms control.
2. The factors causing some Soviet officials to challenge, modify, or defend the traditional views.
3. The key arguments and personalities involved in the current discussion.
4. The most likely directions for near-term change in the Soviet position regarding ballistic missile defenses and the ABM Treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> In the Western Sovietological community, the very idea of public "debates" among Soviet officials is itself a subject of contention. The term "debate" as used here is interchangeable with "discussion".

## **STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT**

For the Soviets since the Leninist era, war has been viewed as a rational act of states, wherein there can be only one rational goal, namely, pursuit of victory. Limited only by technical capabilities in hand, the basis for victory has always been considered two interrelated, mutually reinforcing requirements:

- the quickest possible destruction of the opponent as a political entity and military force
- the survival of the Soviet Union as a communist system and the dominant military power

Unlike some Western propensities, the Soviets have never equated offensive strategy with offensive forces and weapons or defensive strategy with defensive forces and weapons. On the contrary, both strategic offensive and strategic defensive means have been considered necessary to satisfy the dual requirements for victory. Strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces, at the level of strategy, were deemed to be complementary, mutually reinforcing, and mutually obligatory for success in major war. In weapons development and procurement, the Soviet leadership has always expended considerable resources for both attack and protection. This "dialectic" premise of synergistic need for both strategic offense and strategic defense within an offensive strategy did not arise in the post-WW II nuclear age; it was simply updated.

### **Traditional Requirements For Defense, and The ABM Treaty**

The Soviets began to deploy BMD<sup>2</sup> nearly simultaneously with the deployment of ground-based ballistic missiles in the first half of the 1960s. Doubtlessly, some early euphoria lead some Soviet leaders to the expectation of a comprehensive "defense of the country from nuclear missile attack."<sup>3</sup>

This view of impregnable strategic defenses as an ultimate aspiration was never fully rejected. Soon however, more sober Soviet assessments publicly acknowledged a different perspective for the foreseeable future. Indeed, by the mid- to late-1960s, the standard line, espoused even by Air Defense Forces commanders, was that the Soviet strategic defenses would

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<sup>2</sup>The Soviets started deployment of the Griffon ABM around Leningrad in 1962, but soon halted and dismantled the sites.. Shortly thereafter, they paraded and subsequently deployed the Galosh ABM around Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov, "On Guard of the Homeland," *Voyennyye znaniya*, No. 1, January 1963, p. 4.

only intercept "many missiles of the enemy."<sup>4</sup> After the mid-1960s, therefore, the motive force in Soviet policy and behavior with respect to strategic defenses proceeded from three premises:

- A totally effective strategic defense system was technically infeasible for at least the near term;
- A strategic defense system was nonetheless an integral element of an offensive strategy insofar as it might provide "relative defensibility" and damage-limitation;
- The actual value of a strategic defense system was inherently tied to the effectiveness of counterforce offensive strikes to preempt enemy attack.

By 1968, the Soviets had ceased what Western experts anticipated would have been a fairly large BMD deployment. It followed that --for the foreseeable future--the Soviets were prepared to rely on preemptive counterforce strategic strikes, augmented by limited BMD and other strategic defenses, to meet the requirements of enemy destruction and national survival.

Yet, American actions complicated the scenario. Precisely at this time, the U.S. leadership, albeit with rocky congressional approval, resolved to begin deployment of the Safeguard ABM system at twelve planned sites. Safeguard portended significant steps toward a meaningful U.S. silo defense against Soviet counterforce, preemptive strikes. In sum, the Safeguard decision cast considerable uncertainty on the very cornerstone of the evolving Soviet strategy for strategic conflict, i.e., counterforce preemption.

Thus there was significant incentive and considerable logic in the unexpected Soviet enthusiasm for ABM limitations near the outset of the SALT I talks. From the Soviet perspective, BMD limitations promised:

- a continuing free-ride for Soviet ballistic missiles in a preemptive strike, especially against U.S. retaliatory weapons;
- A "crushing" retaliatory strike by Soviet forces, even if the United States struck first, sufficient to destroy the United States and deny it "victory;"
- some constraints on BMD development and testing, an area of technology where the U.S. generally enjoyed a lead; and,
- no impediments to fixed, ground-based BMD R&D or the other non-BMD elements of strategic defense (ASATs, SAMs, civil

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<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Marshal of Aviation V.A. Sudets (Commander of the National Air Defense Forces), "As the Party Orders," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony*, No. 5, May 1966, p. 4.

defense, etc.) for which the Soviets had considerable experience and continuing interest.

In summary, by the late 1960s the Soviets had not lost interest in strategic defense in general, or in the development of their own ballistic missile defense. However, in the context of the U.S. Safeguard program and their own technical limitations, they determined that very limited mutual BMD deployment was preferable to a major U.S. silo-protection system that would threaten Soviet counterforce planning. The Soviet decision to accept ABM Treaty limitations was, therefore, not derived from the rejection of strategic defense or the rejection of a requirement for a damage-limitation capability.

### **SOVIET VIEWS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN THE 1980s**

Soviet dependence on a counterforce strategy and strategic offensive forces in the event of escalation to nuclear war remained into the 1980s as a bedrock of Soviet military thought, strategy, weapons procurement, and arms control policy. At the same time, the Soviets continued their post-SALT I direction, with considerable investment in and upgrading of every other aspect of strategic defense, except large-scale BMD deployment.

However, by the early 1980s, the Soviet military leadership began to feel the sting of two impending problems, one external and one internal.

Externally, the United States and its NATO allies, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, began to establish a consensus in favor of renewed military strength. From the Soviet perspective, the future portended:

- a cohesive and committed political opposition from the West, which accepted the challenge of "direct confrontation" with the "evil empire;"
- an improved and more survivable U.S. strategic counterforce, counter-silo capability not only for its land-based ICBMs but also its already highly survivable SLBMs, as well as increasingly capable "strategic" nuclear threats from Great Britain and France; and,
- perhaps even more dangerously, an asymmetrical theater nuclear and conventional capability to strike Soviet homeland-based strategic offensive forces without (1) significant strategic or even tactical warning and (2) escalation to U.S. "strategic" assets.

To stave off this disturbing trend would obviously require considerable effort on the Soviet part. However, such an effort was squarely confronted by the second category of problems, namely, the general economic and societal

malaise that occurred during "the period of stagnation under Brezhnev." This period included the stagnation and subsequent decline of Soviet economic growth rates over the 1970s; and the relative weakening of Soviet science and technology (S&T) in critical areas.

A sobering assessment of long-term trends in the "correlation of forces" caused spokesmen for the Armed Forces such as then Chief of Staff Ogarkov to mount vehement public calls for major societal reprioritization, reform, and restructuring. To ignore these warnings, cautioned Ogarkov in the early 1980s, would only lead to "serious consequences." By 1985, Soviet leaders generally accepted the need to make systematic changes. For all, including those who viewed military competition as the critical long-term problem, economic revitalization was the near-term priority. As the consumer of resources from a shrinking economic base, the military leadership recognized that short-term benefits might produce long-term disadvantage. Moreover, given the projected trend, it was commonly accepted that economic reform had to be fundamental.

### **The SDI and Soviet Reactions**

It was within this already existing sense of long-term crisis that President Reagan announced his intentions for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on 23 March 1983. A revitalized U.S. BMD program threatened to undermine Soviet strategy and to widen the technological disparity in key military capabilities, especially in space. The Soviet response by then General Secretary Andropov was strongly negative. Since then, the set of Soviet public arguments against the SDI have remained fairly stable, and largely consistent with Soviet opposition to the earlier U.S. Safeguard program. These include variations on each of the following themes:

- The SDI is part of U.S. first-strike plans and consequently is inherently destabilizing;
- The SDI will not be effective against Soviet countermeasures, and will be much more expensive than Soviet countermeasures;
- The SDI will spur an offensive arms race and forestall offensive arms reductions.

One of the first and most prominent Soviet themes against SDI was that, rather than being defensive, as Washington claimed, it was intended to enable the United States to attain a first-strike capability. Soviet military spokesmen charged that BMD is the principal vehicle that would enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war at an acceptable price.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See, for example, Major General of Aviation Boris Surikov, "How We'll Counter SDI," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 16 July 1988, pp. 86-87. Surikov was a member of the SALT I negotiating team and is an expert on space-based weapons.



General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev himself set the tone for much of the Soviet Union's critique of the SDI when he stated in a 1985 *Pravda* interview that:

Everybody has heard a great deal about the "Star Wars" plans....The terminology appears to be taken from science fiction, but it is used to hide a real and serious danger to our planet. I would describe as fantastic the arguments that are used to serve as a basis for the militarization of space. They talk about defense but prepare for attack. They advertise a space shield but are forging a space sword. They promise to liquidate nuclear armaments but in practice build up these armaments and improve them. They promise the world stability, but in reality are working to disrupt the military equilibrium....

It is even asserted that by creating space weapons it is possible to do away with nuclear arms. This is a trick to deceive people....The creation of space weapons can have only one result: the arms race will become even more intensive and will embrace new spheres....<sup>6</sup>

In his 1985 interview with *Time* magazine, Gorbachev warned that SDI would intensify the arms race and thus the threat of war, but he also labeled the SDI's goal of defending against a nuclear attack "a fantasy, an empty dream."<sup>7</sup> A number of Soviet military officials expressed similar views.<sup>8</sup>

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, then Chief of the General Staff, emerged publicly as one of the most prominent advocates of preserving the ABM Treaty. His apparent views were distilled in two *Pravda* articles during 1985 and subsequently reiterated when he moved from the General Staff to Gorbachev's office. Akhromeyev emphasized that the ABM Treaty "is of fundamental importance to the entire process of limiting nuclear arms and...is the foundation on which strategic stability and international security are based."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>*Pravda*, 8 April 1985.

<sup>7</sup> "M.S. Gorbachev's Replies to the American *Time* Magazine," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 September 1985. At a press conference for journalists covering the Washington summit of December 1987, Gorbachev again spoke out strongly against SDI, see, *Pravda*, 12 December 1987.

<sup>8</sup>See for example, General of the Army V.M. Shabanov, "Prohibiting the Militarization of Space," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 14 November 1985; and, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, "Preserving What Has Been Achieved in the Sphere of Strategic Arms Limitation," *Pravda*, 6 November 1985.

<sup>9</sup> Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, "Washington's Assertions and the Actual Facts," *Pravda*, 19 October 1985. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, "The ABM Treaty--An Obstacle in the Path of the Strategic Arms Race," *Pravda*, 4 June 1985.

The tone of the public Soviet reaction to the SDI through 1988 can be divided into two general periods: (1) 1983 to 1986, and (2) 1986 to 1988. The distinguishing feature beginning in 1986 was an overall softening of the harsh public attacks that characterized the initial period. According to some published and personal reports, the initial response was driven by not only the general "crisis" assessment, but also concern that U.S. deployment of space-based defenses could provide the U.S. with an extremely important force multiplier for terrestrial forces. Time and an obvious downturn in Congressional support for SDI and near-term BMD deployment may have ameliorated Soviet concerns. Nevertheless, despite this apparent reduction in the intensity of Soviet opposition and some concessions at the 1987 Washington Summit, through 1988 the Soviets appeared to be unanimous in their public opposition to expanded BMD.

## **STRATEGIC DEFENSES: THE CURRENT DEBATE**

### **The Political Context of the Debate**

When Gorbachev came to power in early 1985, most Soviet leaders acknowledged that changes had to be made. Those who seemed to contest Gorbachev, such as Grishin and Gromyko, were quickly dispatched. The remainder were left to squabble over the necessary scope, depth, and pace.

All Soviet leaders agreed, therefore, that the most essential long-term problem was the economy. Without fundamental change in and refurbishing of the economy, the Soviet Union would continue to fall behind the new Western challenge, even in the military field. In addition, the military recognized and accepted the need to revitalize the general economic base from which the Armed Forces drew as a consumer of resources. Continuing to drain the base might result in short-term advantage, but produce a long-term downturn in the new competitive environment as the rules of the game altered swiftly.

In this context, it appears that the pro-defense segment of the Soviet leadership struck a deal with the Gorbachev regime. The military would accept short-term constraint and even unilateral cuts in return for a promise of a long-term reorientation of the economy and society toward the qualitative directions essential for meeting the projected U.S./NATO military threat of the 1990s and beyond.

However, the general consensus for reform, including military reform, that existed in 1985 was relatively short-lived. As long as military reform remained an ill-defined concept, consensus was easy. With the transformation from vague concept to policy guidance and implementation, the consensus broke down. Publicly aired conflicts over the concrete directions and priorities of Soviet security policy ensued on a broad range of fundamental issues. The current debate concerning strategic defense is simply a more specific form of a longer-standing and more comprehensive debate among Soviet leaders.

## **The Content of the Debate**

While the available evidence and identifiable sources are still too meager to talk about "schools of thought" or "interest groups," the known participants can be characterized for present analytic purpose as falling into five categories on strategic defense issues (see Appendix A for information on the individual participants):

- advocates of mutual strategic offense dominance at lower force levels with no BMD or ASAT defenses;
- advocates of mutual strategic offense dominance at lower levels with continued observance of the ABM Treaty limitations "as signed;"
- advocates of mutual strategic offense dominance at lower force levels with mutual deployment of limited ground-based strategic defenses;
- advocates of modernization and expansion of Soviet BMD consistent with an alleged growing Western threat; and,
- advocates of mutual strategic defense dominance with mutual reduction of strategic offenses to a minimal level.

### **I. Arbatov: Advocate of Offense Dominance and Critic of Strategic Defense**

Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov authored one of the initial inputs to the BMD discussion.<sup>10</sup> Arbatov contended that political approaches, especially diplomatic negotiations, should take precedence over military strength in ensuring future Soviet security, and that the Soviet "defensive military doctrine" should be "defensive" not just rhetorically but in its military-operational aspect as well. Consequently, according to Arbatov, the Armed Forces "are only at the beginning of a long and difficult path," which will necessitate:

the perestroika [restructuring] of our doctrine, strategy, operational plans, Armed Forces quantitative levels and structures, deployment locations and training system, and armament and combat equipment replacement programs.

Arbatov rejected the possibility of victory in a major confrontation at any level, and instead endorsed the basic aims of "nuclear and conventional war prevention." Arbatov proposed "complementary, more concrete correctives for the strategy of defense sufficiency," that are key to his ensuing discussion on strategic defenses. Arbatov's list includes:

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<sup>10</sup>A.G. Arbatov, "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 33-47.

- "As long as nuclear weapons are not completely liquidated by agreement, the combat mission of offensive and defensive strategic means is not damage limitation in case of nuclear war (which is impossible in any case) and not destruction of the aggressor's Armed Forces, but crushing retaliatory strikes on his life-forming centers."
- "The mission of the Armed Forces and conventional armaments is not the waging of offensive strategic operations in the main European and Asian theaters of war, but defensive operations aimed at the frustration (sryv) of the opponent's offensive operations."
- "Protracted conventional war is impossible. The mission of the Armed Forces is to deny the opponent victory in intensive, short-duration combat operations and prevent unpunished nuclear escalation."

Based upon these premises and "correctives," Arbatov next analyzed the mission and acquisition of strategic offensive and defensive weapons within his proposed "new approach" to "reliable or defense sufficiency." In essence, he showed a decided preference for retaliatory actions over preemptive or defensive strategic operations, and countervalue targeting over counterforce. Specifically, he posited that the mission of Soviet offensive "armaments" is to survive a U.S. first strike and inflict unacceptable damage by retaliatory strikes on "the aggressor's economic objects." For those Soviet (and Western) readers who are used to the traditional Soviet discussion of preemptive strikes as "retaliation" and to the old requirements for "victory" through offensive counterforce targeting, Arbatov further specifies that he really means "retaliatory" countervalue strikes. Yet, he seems to arrive at this conclusion more by a process of elimination than by preference--he considers and dismisses preemption and even retaliatory counterforce strikes, intended for damage limitation, as being infeasible. Arbatov adds that "a total of 400 megaton-class nuclear warheads", which constitutes in his calculation about 10 to 15 percent of modern Soviet strategic forces, could destroy up to 70 percent of U.S. industrial potential. As long as this number survives under all war scenarios, requirements for any additional strategic offensive forces "are dubious in all respects and, certainly, unwarranted in the scheme of sufficiency." Arbatov's discussion along these lines is similar to the simplistic U.S. discussions of "assured destruction" during the mid-to-late 1960s.

Arbatov next turns his attention to "the advisability of our echeloned and, apparently, highly expensive system of [strategic] air defense." While exhibiting some sympathy for a defensive posture at the conventional level, he underscores that "in the sphere of nuclear weapons, hopes for a real military-technical defense are a costly and counterproductive illusion." At most, admitted Arbatov, the Soviet Union needs "a certain, far more modest air [anti-aircraft] defense system" for early warning of attack, peacetime air space

protection, and defense from possible terrorists. Likewise, he acknowledged a necessity for anti-aircraft defense "on the operational-tactical non-nuclear level" for the defense of troops from air strikes.

Arbatov's stance against anti-missile defense, however, appears near absolute; he explicitly rejects:

- the Moscow ABM defense, because it does not guarantee protection against either strikes of the larger strategic powers (the United States, Great Britain, or France), terrorists, other nuclear states, or even unsanctioned and accidental launches and because it leaves other major Soviet cities--such as Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Sverdlovsk, and Novosibirsk--"hostage" to foreign ballistic missiles;<sup>11</sup>
- ABM as a solution for "third world" threats in favor of political measures;
- ABM as the method for prevention of decapitating strikes against the military-political leadership in favor of improvements in the survivability, effectiveness, and quality of underground and airborne C2 systems.

Consistent with his general opposition to strategic defenses, Arbatov concluded his discussion of strategic offensive and defensive forces by noting the "unshakeability" [nezyblemost'] of the ABM Treaty.

## **II. Advocates of the Status Quo on BMD**

Following an initial period of absolute opposition to any strategic defense options beyond those sanctioned by an ill-defined but extremely narrow interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Soviet position under Gorbachev evolved in three directions. First, the Soviet administration proposed to negotiate a definition of permissible testing. Second, at the 1987 Washington Summit Gorbachev acknowledged the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty and agreed that the Soviet Union would be willing to drop its strict requirement for observance of the ABM Treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972," at a given time after SOF cuts. Gorbachev agreed in the final communique to permit each side to "follow its own course of action" after the ABM non-withdrawal period if no mutual understanding could be reached. Third, soon after the Washington Summit, the Soviets began to back away from their

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<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, one of the more polemical responses to Arbatov (which this survey does not review in depth) accused Arbatov of taking the opposite position. Specifically, Arbatov is chastised for seeking to nullify the 1972 ABM Treaty by an incorrectly alleged proposal to deploy a "thin" screening of the country's territory for defense from terrorist strikes, other possible nuclear powers, and unsanctioned and accidental missile launches. (See General Major Yu. Lyubimov, "About Sufficiency of Defense and Insufficiency of Competency," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil*, No. 16, August 1989, p.26.) Arbatov's point, conversely, is that such goals would require at least a "thin" defense, which the Moscow ABM cannot provide. Thus, the Moscow ABM has little value.

compromises concerning BMD, and have essentially returned to a position of endorsing only continued observation of the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

Many of the recent Soviet commentaries on BMD essentially support this existing official position. Occasional viewpoints, such as expressed by General Colonel Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy,<sup>12</sup> specifically identify the positive benefits of the current arrangement. First, the current Treaty-compliant Moscow-only BMD system, emphasized Kraskovskiy, is sufficient to protect the chief C2 center (Moscow), especially from accidental and unsanctioned launches. Second, insofar as U.S. officials are "planning and capable" of a rapid ABM deployment because of the SDI program, the Soviet system provides a basis for a corresponding expansion on the Soviet side. As a consequence, it is argued that even if current ABM launchers remain restricted, Soviet ABM development allocations should not be curtailed, but increased.

### **III. The Advocates of Mutual Deployment of Limited Defenses, Including Ground-Based (Only) Interceptors**

Nearly simultaneously with the appearance of the original (March 1989) Arbatov article, other Soviet officials began to comment on the possibility of cooperative efforts toward mutual strategic defense deployments. In a February 1989 article--the first on the issue that we have been able to identify--Ednan Agayev, a Second Secretary of the International Organizations Department in the Foreign Affairs Ministry challenged the offensive orientation of current nuclear deterrence concepts as codified in the 1972 ABM Treaty. According to Agayev, nuclear deterrence:

which presently epitomizes the offensive, that is, an objectively aggressive philosophy, must be changed. It was formulated and legalized in final form in 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed. According to this document, the USSR and the USA refrained from the development of defensive strategic systems in favor of offensive armaments. The logic of their choice was quite understandable....

However, as the strict logician Rene Descartes pointed out, it is necessary to call everything into question in order to arrive at the truth. And hasn't the present "deterrence by offensive" long been ripe for that? The only modern deterrence is defensive. And its prerequisites, even if they are only intellectual, already exist.<sup>13</sup>

While Agayev's argument did not support abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the implicit questioning of the ABM Treaty represented a departure from

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<sup>12</sup>*Trud*, 26 May 1990.

<sup>13</sup>E.T. Agayev, "Toward a New Model of Strategic Stability," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'*, No. 2, February 1989, p. 107.

previous public Soviet statements regarding missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Another article appearing in *Moscow News* on 4 February 1990, authored by Andrei Kortunov, a leading arms control expert at the Institute of the United States and Canada, suggests "a compromise over anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems" could be a part of START II.<sup>14</sup> Subsequently, several commentators, including high ranking military figures, began to present the view that agreed deployment of limited BMD might be acceptable if aimed against Third Party, accidental, unauthorized, or terrorist attacks.

Concern about Third-Party ballistic missile threats has recently appeared in numerous Soviet statements and articles.<sup>15</sup> The Soviet Defense Ministry's *Draft Reform Plan*, signed by Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov, underscores the threat from Third Party ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.<sup>16</sup> Some Soviet writers and officials have recommended mutual BMD deployment as a response to this threat. For example, a piece in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* by General Major V. Belous and General Lieutenant M. Vinogradov warned of the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and suggested that both the Soviet Union and the United States might perceive a need to defend against this threat by building ground-based BMD systems. "However," they argued, "one provision that remains fundamental is the non-siting in space of strike weapons....".<sup>17</sup> Sergei Blagovolin, of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, observes that although support for missile defense is not the "norm," the emerging threat has changed previous views: "I do not think that an SDI system designed exclusively to guard against the threat of nuclear blackmail by other [non-Superpower] regimes would have even the slightest negative effect on the superpower strategic balance. In fact, if it is a joint effort it will actually strengthen confidence."<sup>18</sup>

Perhaps most dramatic of the recent Soviet statements supportive of missile defense against limited threats is that by Lt. Col. Viktor Alksnis. Alksnis is the Coordinator of Soyuz, a conservative faction within the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, possibly including as many as 500 deputies. In an article, appearing in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, Alksnis' speech during a session of the Supreme Soviet is quoted verbatim. The following is a quote from Alksnis' speech:

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<sup>14</sup>FBIS-SOV-90-037, February, 23, 1990, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> See for example, *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 4 September 1990.

<sup>16</sup>In, *Pravitelstvennyy Vestnik*, No. 48, November 1990, pp. 5-10; FBIS-Sov-90-239, December 12, 1990, p. 63.

<sup>17</sup> *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 23 August 1990.

<sup>18</sup>Sergei Blagovolin, "The Gulf Crisis and Arms Control: A Soviet View," *International Defense Review*, No. 11, 1990, p. 1233.

I would like to touch on the issue of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. I am increasingly leaning toward the point of view of the Americans, who, according to the information available to me, are primarily designing this system as a defense against an accidental nuclear attack. I believe that a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States is indeed impossible. However, who can rule out such a possibility, given the proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of mass destruction throughout the world? Iraq already has a nuclear bomb. It looks like Israel has also created one, as well as the Republic of South Africa. Brazil has now suspended development; however, all of such work is under way. Will we not need to create our own SDI in order to rule out the possibility of a strike against Soviet territory by, for example (I would not like to predict this) Iraq if the situation aggravated?

We are saying that we will create an asymmetrical version of our own SDI, that is, to defend against American missiles. However, we absolutely disregard the probability of a possible strike by some nuclear terrorist, a blackmailer who may capture some installation with nuclear weapons and threaten the Soviet Union. Who is thinking about this? Why does the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not think about this?<sup>19</sup>

It is likely that any new Soviet ground-based interceptors deployed in the near future would be intended for defense of major political-administrative, population, and military-industrial centers. The ABM system around Moscow is intended primarily for the protection of the political and military leaders in their underground bunkers but will benefit the general population as well. Interestingly, during a recent interview with the newspaper *Trud*, General Colonel Volter Kraskovskiy was asked by the correspondent: "What played the determining role during selection of the [Moscow] region [for an ABM system]? We really have regions that are much more important in a strategic sense..." Kraskovskiy replied that "Moscow is the most important political, administrative, and industrial center of the State. All organs and all threads of command and control, including with the country's defense, are concentrated here...."<sup>20</sup> Further, General Yu. A. Gor'kov noted in the May 1990 issue of *Voyennaya mysl'* that in the Soviet press, "some authors declaim for creating a strong air and missile-space defense so that Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and other cities do not become hostages."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Quoted in *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, November 12, 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-230, November 29, 1990. pp. 43.

<sup>20</sup> *Trud*, 26 May 1990.

<sup>21</sup> General Colonel Yu.A. Gor'kov, "Still More on PVO Sufficiency," *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 5, May 1990, p. 54. In-depth discussion of the Gor'kov viewpoint appears below.



A relatively thin ABM shield probably would suffice in Soviet eyes, as the discussion by Arbatov and others cited above suggests. Limited, ground-based BMD deployment would play to Moscow's strong suit (the Soviets have worked for some 30 years on development of ground-based systems and already have upgraded the Moscow ABM complex twice) and foil U.S. capabilities to begin space-based deployment of BMD interceptors.

An idea of the scope of ABM expansion that the Soviets may envisage may be gleaned from another article by General V. Belous in which he identifies 1,000 ground-based interceptors as the number suggested by Western analysts as necessary to counter such Third-Party threats:

In order to eliminate this threat, SDI's apologists argue that it is necessary at the least to develop a "thin" ABM defense capable of successfully dealing with small numbers of incoming missiles. One of the plans for this kind of defense proposes siting 1,000 ground-based interceptor-missiles in six areas of the United States. Mindful of current realities, we should hardly deny the possibility of reasonable compromises...in the development of defenses for U.S. and U.S.S.R territory against accidental missile launches or blackmail attempts and threats made by third countries.<sup>22</sup>

In another article it is suggested that the 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty might be eliminated. Writing in New Times, a Soviet publication for Western audiences, Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Fedorenko suggest that, given certain preconditions, START II could include "possible joint reconsideration or abolting [sic] of the 1974 protocol annexed to the 1972 ABM Treaty."<sup>23</sup> This, of course, would permit two BMD sites with 100 fixed, ground-based interceptors at each site.

It appears that the sine qua non of Soviet willingness to consider ABM Treaty modifications is that BMD weapon deployment be limited and ground based. Putting a cap on SDI in this manner would buy time for the Soviets to overcome the technological drawbacks that currently make space basing difficult and expensive. Moscow could use the time thus gained to pursue its large R&D program that includes advanced BMD technologies--notably ground- and space-based lasers.

In a well known article that appeared in *Pravda* on 20 July 1989, Professor V. Etkin, Chief of Applied Space Physics at the Institute of Space Research, has suggested the extension of cooperative BMD systems into space:

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<sup>22</sup>General Major V. Belous, "The SDI Syndrome: Seven Years Since the United States Announced the 'Strategic Defense Initiative,'" *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 23 March 1990, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup>"After the Treaty: What's in Store?" New Times, 17 April 1990, p. 11.

A similar [cooperative decision] is also possible in the sphere of space-based ABM defense positions, whose capabilities in a global conflict are being questioned in both the U.S.S.R. and the United States. But what if the conflict is not global? What if we are talking about guarantees against accidental launches or, above all, missile launches by extremist groups? Such a limited system including ground- and space-based positions for combatting non-massed missile launches is within the bounds of feasible technical solutions.

Etkin's article may constitute a trial balloon to test the reaction of military officials to space-based BMD. Although other articles and statements by Soviet officials have indicated possible acceptance of space-based sensors,<sup>24</sup> it is the only article in Soviet media that explicitly endorses space-based interceptors.

#### **IV. Gor'kov and Asriyev: Advocates of Soviet Strategic Defense Modernization**

To date, the two leading spokesmen for a maximum strategic defense have been General Colonel (Reserves) Yu. A. Gor'kov<sup>25</sup> and General Lieutenant N.A. Asriyev.<sup>26</sup> In separate articles in May 1990, the two Soviet Generals directly opposed the Arbatov piece, arguing for the standard of "relative defensibility," rather than 100 percent defense effectiveness, and the need for strategic defense protection in depth to counter U.S. offensive air-space operations (Gor'kov: *vozdushno-kosmicheskaya operatsiya*) and air-space attack means (Asriyev: *sredstva vozdushno-kosmicheskogo napadeniya*):

Gor'kov clearly favors BMD, as well as ATBM and anti-aircraft defenses:

Thus, it is necessary not simply to have an air defense system in peacetime, but to maintain it at such a level which would ensure the frustration (repulse) [*sryv (otrazheniye)*] of the initial air operations in a conventional war or air-space operations in nuclear war (even if weakened).

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<sup>24</sup>For example, in fall 1989 Ambassador Yuli Kuznetsov, the Soviet Chief DST negotiator, stated that, "All devices that are not weapons can be permitted [in space]." Quoted in, TASS, September 26, 1989.

<sup>25</sup> General Colonel Yu. A. Gor'kov, "Still More on PVO Sufficiency," *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 54-58.

<sup>26</sup> General Lieutenant N.A. Asriyev, "Without Forgetting the Lessons of the Past," *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 58-63.

Asriyev came to a similar conclusion on strategic defenses, observing that, "therefore, we need concrete armaments, which would ensure struggle with not only existing, but also prospective air-space attack means."

On the issue of sizing Soviet air defenses requirements, Asriyev endorses a capability to protect virtually all assets, including urban/industrial, while, Gor'kov takes the position that Soviet defenses should focus on the protection of Soviet strategic war-fighting capabilities, including C2 points, ICBMs, airports, and air defense positions. In contrast to Arbatov's position, Gor'kov concedes the possibility of air defense reductions only "after a reduction of strategic offensive forces."<sup>27</sup>

## V. Advocates of Defense Dominance

At the opposite extreme of Arbatov's offense-only view is the position which questions the wisdom of deterrence and stability based principally on strategic offensive forces. While noting that the ABM Treaty may have been appropriate in its time, they maintain that circumstances have changed and the Treaty needs to be reevaluated in the context of (1) a truly defensive Soviet military doctrine and (2) the continuing U.S. commitment to SDI-related work. With mutual reductions in strategic offenses, as well as "stringent" limitations on active technical countermeasures and defense suppression, it is argued,<sup>28</sup> mutual transition to defense dominance would ensure stability insofar as neither side could effectively attack the other even in a crisis situation.<sup>29</sup> In the single Soviet publication found expressing this position, it is suggested that sensor and battle management satellites should be permitted in space, with all weapons, including missiles and beam weapons, located on the ground. To those who counter that the transition would entail considerable risk, they state that the process should be gradual, coordinated, and phased.

The five positions outlined above constitute the broad perspectives represented in the ongoing debate. It should be noted that some of these

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<sup>27</sup> This premise would again tend to confirm the present interpretation that Gor'kov's concept of air defense goes beyond simple anti-aircraft defense alone. For it makes little sense to make anti-aircraft defense alone dependent on a prior reduction of strategic offensive forces.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, the detailed argument presented in M. Aleksandrov, "Defense Domination Versus Nuclear Containment," *Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye* and *Soviet Military Review*, No. 12, December 1989. Officially, *Soviet Military Review* is said to be the English-language edition of *Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye*; however, for any given issue, articles will appear in one that never appear in the other. It is noteworthy, therefore, that the Aleksandrov article appears in both the Russian- and the English-language editions.

<sup>29</sup> In an accompanying rejoinder article, General B. Surikov countered with the standard arguments that (1) nullification of the ABM Treaty would "destroy the foundation" for offensive reductions, (2) space-based weapons of all types are per se destabilizing, and (3) an expanded U.S. strategic defense system would mandate a Soviet asymmetrical offensive response. (General Major of Aviation [Retired] B.T. Surikov, former member of the Soviet SALT I delegation, "The ABM Race Is Inadmissible," *Sovetskoye voyennoye obozreniye* and *Soviet Military Review*, No. 12, December 1989.)

"positions" are represented by a single article or individual writer. The alternative to current policy reflected most frequently in recent articles and statements is the third position identified above.

To date, judging from the available evidence, none of the alternatives to the current official position--which remains supportive of the ABM Treaty "as signed"--appears to have garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. Conversely, none of the alternative positions seem to have sufficient strength and authority to close the discussion. Thus, the debate continues.

In some respects, the current discussion is a departure from traditional "debates" in Soviet experience, but--like the larger conflict on defense sufficiency, itself--perhaps is representative for future debates under *glasnost*. The participants reflect a broad range of institutions, both military and non-military. With the general outlines of the various positions already drawn, it is to be expected that future statements will take a considerably briefer form and that future "debaters" will address partial aspects of the whole, knowing that informed Soviet readers will understand the general purpose and context.

### **Apparent Soviet Architectural Preferences**

The available evidence is insufficient to permit a determination of whether or how the Soviets will shift their policy position with regard to BMD deployment and the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, there is evidence, from open Soviet publications and some statements by Soviet officials, that provides a general outline of Soviet preferences for any expansion of permitted BMD capabilities. Soviet statements discussing the possibility of joint BMD deployment efforts appear to denote a more flexible attitude by the Soviets toward modification of the ABM Treaty than has previously been the case.

These statements indicate a general opposition to the deployment of space-based BMD interceptors, but do not indicate similar opposition to space-based sensors. Only the single article appearing in *Pravda* on 20 July 1989, by Professor Etkin, has suggested the extension of cooperative BMD systems into space.

In contrast, more recent statements indicate that Soviet interest would be in the expanded, but still limited, deployment of those ground-based BMD interceptors permitted by the ABM Treaty. These have cited ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World as justification for possible deployment of additional BMD. If Moscow in fact agrees to amend the Treaty, based on the available evidence, it probably would be in the context of this threat.

New Soviet interceptors would likely be deployed around major cities--presumably within the Russian Republic but perhaps elsewhere as well. The scope for BMD expansion preferred by the Soviets may be gleaned from

several recent statements. These cite or acknowledge 1,000 ground-based interceptors as levels associated with third-party threats.

In summary, given available evidence, it appears that if the Soviets decide to move toward expanded BMD capabilities, their preference will be for revision of the ABM Treaty to permit additional ground-based sites and interceptors. The extent to which additional defensive capabilities and characteristics, such as space-basing, might be negotiable cannot be determined from available evidence. Based on past Soviet behavior and some recent statements, it is likely to be affected by the level of demonstrated U.S. commitment to the program.

# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
Ednan Agayev	Second Secretary of the International Organization Department, MFA	"K novoi modeli strategicheskoi stabil'nosti [Toward A New Model of Strategic Stability]." <u>Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn</u> , No. 2, 1989, p. 107-111.	"But its [nuclear deterrence] character which at present epitomizes offensive--that is, objectively an aggressive--philosophy, should change. It was finally formulated and legalized in 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed... The logic of their choice was quite understandable...but...in order to get to the truth it is necessary to call everything in question. And hasn't the present "offensive deterrence" been long ripe for that? The only modern deterrence is defensive."
Mikhail Aleksandrov	Senior Expert, Assessment and Planning Department, MFA	"Defense Domination Versus Nuclear Containment." <u>Soviet Military Review</u> , Dec 1989, p. 50-51.	Development of defenses is correct and could lead to a more stable superpower relationship. The transition to such a new relationship would be stable because deployment would be phased and coordinated.
Lt. Col. Viktor Alksnis	Coordinator of Soyuz legislative group	Speech before the October 15 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet reprinted in <u>Literaturnaya Rossiya</u> , Nov 12, 1990, p. 18-19.	Proliferation requires Soviet interest in a limited BMD system for protection against third party strikes. Recounts his increasing attraction to the "American" interest in deploying a system for protection against accidents, although does not mention joint or cooperative BMD deployment.

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press

# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
Alexei Arbatov	Institute of World Economics & International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences	"How Much Defense is Sufficient?" <u>International Affairs</u> (Moscow), April 1989, p. 39	Moscow ABM system cannot provide nationwide protection against accidental or third party strikes, but opposes expansion. Doubts the efficacy of defenses including Moscow ABM, SDI, or APVO.
Maj. Gen. Vladimir Belous	Senior Scientific Associate, Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace & Against the Nuclear Threat Chief of the Teaching Dept., Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineering Academy (1987)	"The SDI Syndrome. Seven Years Since the United States Announced the 'Strategic Defense Initiative.'" <u>Sovetskaya Rossiya</u> , 2nd ed., 23 Mar 1990, p. 3.  "What the Generals Think About Disarmament: The Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty and Our Security." <u>Sovetskaya Rossiya</u> , 23 Aug 1990, p. 3.	Risks of multipolar world may require reasonable cooperation on defensive measures. Cites a US plan for 1000 interceptors as an (apparently acceptable) example of a limited deployment. Opposed to space basing. Past (and to some extent current) opposition to SDI as a US attempt to gain strategic advantage.
Sergei Blagovolin	Head of the Dept. of Military Economics and Military Research, Institute of World Economics & International Relations	"The Gulf Crisis and Arms Control: A Soviet View." <u>International Defense Review</u> , No. 11, 1990, p. 1233.	Supports defenses designed to counter third party threat. Believes such defenses could strengthen stability. States that he may be criticized by his colleagues for supporting any BMD.

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press

# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
N. V. Cheburkin	Deputy Director, NPO Astrophysica	Speaking at the 13th International Conference on Lasers, quoted in "Soviet Proposes Joint SDI Laser Research." <u>Military Space</u> , Vol. 7, No. 25, 17 Dec 1990, p. 2.	Lasers could be used in a "mutual program" to defend against terrorist or accidental strikes. Soviet scientists "have some ideas about how to use these systems for accidental or terrorist launches."
Lt. Gen. Detinov	Soviet DST Delegation	Cited in "Report on the Visit of the House Arms Control Observers Group to Geneva, Vienna, and Brussels, October 5-10, 1989." <u>Congressional Record</u> , Vol. 135, No. 156, 8 November 1989, p. H8172.	Moscow ABM system designed to counter mistakes or third country attacks.
Professor V. Etkin	Chief of Applied Space Physics Department, Space Research Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences	"From Secrecy to Trust." <u>Pravda</u> , 2nd ed., 20 July 1989, p. 5.	Limited, joint ground- & space-based ABM as solution for accidental & third party threat.

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press



# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
Sergei Fedorenko	Probable affiliation with the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the US and Canada	"After the Treaty: What's in Store?" <u>New Times</u> , 17 Apr 1990, p. 11.	START II could include the elimination of the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty given certain preconditions.
Col. Gen. Yu. Gorkov (res.)	Chief of Staff, Moscow Air Defense District (1983-1988)	"Still More on PVO Sufficiency." <u>Voyennaya Mysl</u> , No. 5, May 1990, p. 54-58.	Acknowledges that some are suggesting expanding ABM coverage to areas outside the Moscow region.
Andrei Kortunov	Cand. Sc. (Hist.), Head of Sector at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada	"After the Treaty: What's in Store?" <u>New Times</u> , 17 Apr 1990, p. 11.  "Historian Views 'Myths' in Arms Control Process." <u>Moscow News</u> , 4 Feb 1990, p. 13.	<u>Moscow News</u> article suggests that, with preconditions, follow-on to START might include compromises on ABM deployment, although no specifics about compromise are given. <u>New Times</u> article suggests elimination of 1974 protocol to ABM Treaty, given certain preconditions.

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press

# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
Col. Gen. V. Kraskovskiy	Senior APVO officer	Quoted in V. Badurkin. "Just What is ABM?" <u>Izvestia</u> , 26 May 1990, p. 1.	"Primary mission" of Moscow ABM includes protection against accident or unauthorized strikes.
Col. V. Malikov	Officer "who has devoted more than 20 years to the development and formation of the ABM system"	Quoted in Lt. Col. A. Dokuchayev. "A Bridle for the Nuclear 'Racers,' or What the Antiballistic Missile Defense System Represents." <u>Krasnaya Zvezda</u> , 1st ed., Oct 5, 1990, p. 42.	Testing and operations support confidence in Moscow ABM system's ability to stop accidental or unauthorized strikes. Stresses necessity of human role in operation of Moscow system.
Col. N. Parshin	Engineer associated with Moscow ABM	Quoted in Lt. Col. A. Dokuchayev. "A Bridle for the Nuclear 'Racers,' or What the Antiballistic Missile Defense System Represents." <u>Krasnaya Zvezda</u> , 1st ed., Oct 5, 1990, p. 42.	"Of course, there must be a shield. We are not immune from a provocative launch of a missile, either, at least judging from the development of the situation in the Near East. We eliminate one such mad missile--all expenditures will pay for themselves..."

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press

# APPENDIX A

## SOVIET DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL BMD: OVERVIEW OF SELECTED PARTICIPANTS AND STATEMENTS



NAME	POSITION*	SOURCE	SUBSTANCE
Lt. Gen. M. Vinogradov	Probable affiliation with Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace & Against the Nuclear Threat	"What the Generals Think About Disarmament: The Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty and Our Security." <u>Sovetskaya Rossiya</u> , 23 Aug 1990, p. 3.	Proliferation may require US & USSR to seek joint, limited defenses without a space element.
Ambassador Yuli Kuznetsov	Head of Group on SpaceArms (DST Negotiations)	<u>Tass</u> , 26 Sep 1989.	"All devices that are not weapons can be permitted" in space.

\*Positions are as identified in Soviet press

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